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We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine
single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards.
We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than
self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently,
but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-
controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider,
adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient
Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria,
agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.
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Board structures around the world:
An experimental investigation
ABSTRACT
We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine
single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards.
We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than
self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently,
but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-
controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider,
adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient
Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria,
agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.
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I. Introduction
Board structures vary considerably across countries. In the U.S., most boards have major-
ity representation by outside directors and significant insider minority participation. Across the
Atlantic, in the U.K., France, and Italy, most boards feature insider majorities with minority out-
sider participation. Further east, in Germany and Austria, a two-tiered board (dualistisches Model)
structure with an insider managerial (Vorstand) board and an outsider supervisory (Aufsichtsrat)
board is common.
Recently, following a spate of spectacular corporate failures and scandals, all these board
types have been scrutinized by the press, activists, and governments with a view to reforming their
structures. In the U.S., NYSE and NASD exchanges have proposed new rules that mandate board
independence and tighten the definition of an independent director. The Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund has demanded even stricter standards be
imposed.1 In the U.K., for the fourth time in the last 10 years, the British government commis-
sioned a new study of board independence (see Economist (January 23, 2003)). In Germany, the
federal government established two commissions to examine and suggest improvements to corpo-
rate governance practices including the functioning of the two-tiered corporate boards which are
pervasive in Germany (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002)).
The press, government agencies, and investor activists all agree that board reform is desirable.
However, they disagree regarding the desiderata for corporate governance reform. Some advocate
majority outsider or even supermajority outsider representation. Similarly, some advocate elimi-
nating the dual-tiered boards while still others recommend imposing such a structure on boards.
Evaluation of these reform proposals requires an understanding of the relationship between board
structure and performance. To obtain this understanding, it is necessary to compare the effec-
tiveness of board structures, which in turn requires controlling for other institutional, economic,
and social factors that also affect firm performance. Empirical research is constrained by the lack
of independent variation in the control variables and board systems. For example, companies in
1 See corporate Research E-Letter No. 28, October 2002, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/crp-
/oct02.htm.
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countries where two-tiered boards are the norm almost always also feature a high-powered large
outside investor or lead bank. This makes it difficult to identify the independent effect of the two-
tiered structure as opposed to large owner monitoring. Also, legal systems are highly correlated
with board design, with two-tiered boards concentrated in German civil law countries. Another
problem with empirical research on the effects of board structures is the fact that “soft” social
factors, which are very difficult to proxy with standard economic variables, may have a huge in-
fluence on board performance. In fact, these factors may be even more influential than the formal
structure of the board or the legal system in which the firm operates. For example, Franks, Mayer
and Rossi (2004) show that despite the lack of any legal protection for minority shareholders in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the capital market in the U.K. developed at a much
more rapid pace than its continental counterparts which featured some, albeit weak, protection
of outsiders. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi hypothesize that outside investors in the U.K. were pro-
tected better by social networks and social norms than outside investors in other countries were
by formal legal institutions.2 Finally, as noted by Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), board structure
is endogenous, and performance affects structure just as board structure affects performance. For
example, is a negative relation between board size and performance an indication that large boards
make poor decisions or that poorly performing firms expand their boards? As argued by Hermailin
and Weisbach, this endogeneity problem makes unambiguous interpretation of empirical results on
boards and performance difficult. Moreover, as Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2003) point out, the
endogeneity problem cannot be corrected with simple econometric fixes but requires estimating a
complete structural model of the firm. Thus, any conclusion regarding governance and performance
from cross-sectional studies depends for its validity on identifying the correct structural model for
the relation between managerial compensation, corporate investment policy, board structure, and
ownership dispersion. Using a purely theoretical approach, it is equally difficult to identify the re-
lationship between performance and the structure of communication and voting on boards. Many
2 In addition to these factors board structure designs systematically vary with insider trading
law enforcement (see Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)) and institutional investor activism (Kahn
and Winton (1998)).
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different board structures produce identical sets of Nash equilibrium outcomes. Further, in general,
many Nash equilibria are supported for each board structure.3
The considerable practical importance of comparing board structures, combined with the lack
of guidance from conventional theoretical and empirical studies, suggests that researchers examine
the board structure–performance relationship from a new direction—experimental study. This is
the approach we adopt in this paper. Here we experimentally compare the performance and voting
behavior of a variety of board types. To facilitate experimental analysis, and to provide sharp
hypotheses in the context of which to view our results, we initiate our analysis by developing a
simple model of corporate board decision making. Our model captures the basic tradeoff between
inside and outside directors: insiders have better information but outsiders have better incentives.
Insiders have private information regarding the quality of a project that the firm can undertake,
but are biased toward accepting the project regardless of their information. Outside directors have
no private information about project quality but an incentive to block low-quality projects. To
emphasize the stylized role of outside directors in our analysis we call outside directors “watchdogs.”
This model design abstracts from all factors influencing corporate governance other than board
structure. Although the absence of these factors reduces the usefulness of the model for making
cross-sectional empirical predictions, it increases the usefulness of the model for doing what it is
designed to do—isolating the effect of board structure in mitigating opportunistic insider behavior
and predicting the results of our laboratory experiments.
Of course, just as field experiments on board structure and performance suffer from obvious
econometric problems, so experimental simulation of corporate decision making raises the question
of external validity—to what extent do our university-student subjects behave like seasoned exec-
utives acting in real boardrooms? Validity can be questioned on two grounds. First, will the much
smaller payoffs to lab subjects relative to board members lead to differences in behavior? Sec-
3 The theoretical literature on boards, with one exception, Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003),
has focused on other issues. For example, Raheja (2004) considers how managerial succession
affects board performance; Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) consider managerial bargaining power
and how it affects board performance.
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ond, will the different levels of maturity and the contrasting social milieu of business students and
board members render our student results uninformative regarding board behavior? Both of these
questions are empirical and cannot be answered with a priori reasoning. However, we are fairly
confident that the weight of evidence favors external validity. First, consider payment scale differ-
ences. There is a considerable body of research on the effect of monetary payoffs and experimental
subject behavior, articulated most notably by Smith (1976). For games where computational or
memory effort is not an important consideration, as in our game, the evidence this research sug-
gests that shifts in the level of payments received by the agents do not have a dramatic effect
on behavior when subjects are paid relative to the opportunity cost of their time.4 The second
objection is that the personal characteristics of board members and the social context for board
decisions is so different from that faced by student classroom subjects, that drawing conclusions
from one regarding the other is indefensible. This sort of localist argument is logically defensible
but is not consistent with the available scientific evidence or with the conclusions of evolutionary
psychology which argues that similar ecologically relevant problems are solved in a roughly similar
way by most humans.5
4 For example, see Davis and Holt (1992) pp.24-26; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996); and
Forsythe et al. (1991). However, there is evidence that “microscopic” payments, far below the
subject’s perceived level of fair compensation, can reduce performance even below the zero payoff
level in games where the subject is paid for performing tasks (e.g., taking an IQ test) (see Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000)).
5 For empirical evidence where professional play has been compared to responses of student
subjects in a variety of market contexts, see DeJong et. al. (1988); Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989);
Mestelman and Feeny (1988); Plott (1988); and Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988). These
studies find that the behavior of professional decision makers does not qualitatively differ from
that exhibited by the student subject group. Furthermore, the positive use of transferability of
experimental results to corresponding nonexperimental settings has been discussed, among others
by Smith (1982), and in a regulatory context by Issac and Smith (1985) and Plott (1987). The
concept of “ecologically relevant problems” is based on the idea that humans solve most practical
problems by referring them back to a few heuristic rules, rules that were relevant and adaptive to
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We consider four different board structures: a two-tiered board, a single-tier board with a one-
vote watchdog majority and multiple insiders, a single-tier board with a one-vote insider majority,
and a board with just one insider. We characterize Nash equilibria for these four board types,
focusing on their ability to support institutionally preferred corporate policies that maximize firm
value and on the nature of the coordination on which they rely. It is plausible to assume that agent
coordination will lead to outcomes that reflect the interests of the agents. For this reason we con-
sider two refinements to the Nash equilibrium—efficient Nash equilibria and coalition-proof Nash
equilibria. An equilibrium is efficient if no other equilibrium exists that Pareto-dominates that
equilibrium. An equilibrium is coalition-proof if no credible coalition can overturn the equilibrium
(Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987)). We first show that regardless of the number of watchdog
directors or whether the board has one or two tiers, there does not exist any coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium that implements value maximizing corporate policies. Further, despite differences in
communication mechanisms, single-tiered boards with watchdog majorities and multiple insiders
are equivalent to two-tiered boards in terms of the equilibrium outcomes they support. Both board
types implement institutionally preferred corporate policies in an efficient Nash equilibrium. The
coalition-proof outcome for both board types is underinvestment. A board with a single tier and
an insider majority can also support Nash equilibria supporting institutionally preferred corporate
policies. However, these equilibria are not efficient. Further, all coalition-proof equilibrium out-
our ancestors during our species’ evolutionary history. Problems that can be referred back to such
paradigms, “ecologically relevant problems,” will be solved in a roughly similar and reasonable
manner by most humans. We argue that the board of directors problem that we model fits into
a general collection of ecologically relevant human decision problems, problems whereby some
members of a group have both better information and selfish interests, and need to persuade other
members of the group to trust their judgment. Such problems were faced by our hunter-gatherer
ancestors and are faced on a regular basis today, such as by a tenure committee considering the
opinion of faculty members who are expert scholars in the candidate’s field, but are also the
candidate’s personal friends. See, for example, Tooby and Cosmides (1992). The authors would
like to thank Peter Bossaerts for directing our attention to this literature.
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comes supported by insider-majority boards result in overinvestment. The single-tiered board with
only one insider does not support any equilibria producing institutionally preferred policies. In
fact, the only equilibrium outcome supported by this type of board is a coalition-proof equilibrium
resulting in underinvestment.
Using these results as our benchmarks, we performed a laboratory experiment on university
graduate and undergraduate students. In the experiment, contrary to the coalition-proof refine-
ment, even minority representation of watchdogs reduced opportunistic behavior by insiders and
frequently produced value-maximizing outcomes. Thus, even insider majority boards, as long as
they feature substantial watchdog participation, can produce value-maximizing policies. Switch-
ing to a two-tiered board resulted in a perceptible decrease in opportunistic behavior by insiders
and an increase in the frequency with which value-maximizing policies were adopted. However,
treatments which featured single-tiered boards with one-vote watchdog majorities produced much
better results. In these treatments nearly all (93%) of the sessions produced value-maximizing
outcomes. Reducing the number of insiders further had little effect on the outcome. Although
both the two-tiered board and the single-tiered board with an insider majority frequently pro-
duced inefficient outcomes, they displayed different biases. The two-tiered board tends toward
underinvestment, frequently rejecting good projects, while the single-tiered board tended toward
overinvestment, frequently accepting bad projects.
Together with the baseline results in Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003), which documents that
all-insider boards almost always choose inefficient self-interested policies, our results document that
increasing watchdog representation on boards increases efficiency. Moreover, by varying the level
of watchdog participation, this paper is able to document that the marginal benefit of watchdog
participation, while always positive, is decreasing. Although this decreasing rate of improvement is
not always consistent with the predictions of some game-theoretic refinements, it is consistent with
empirical research. For example, Klein (2002) finds that increasing the number of independent
outsiders on audit committees improves reporting. However, almost all the gains from increasing
the number of independent outsiders are largest when the number of insiders was large. Little
improvement was generated by increasing outsider representation on committees that were already
outsider-dominated. These results are also consistent with the experimental economics literature
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on trust that agents are more likely to display trustworthy behavior when they have less power
(see, e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe (1995)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the game, delineates
the equilibria, and describes their properties. Section III describes the experimental design. Section
IV presents results from treatments designed to test our theoretical predictions. In Section V, we
present evidence from additional treatments. The final section concludes the paper and suggests
directions for future research. Proofs are confined to Appendix A.
II. Model
A. Agents and Information
A board consists of n agents belonging to the set N . The first w > 0 are watchdogs who
belong in the set W . The remaining i agents are insiders from the set I . At the beginning of the
game, insiders receive an information signal, s, revealing whether a project is good (G) or bad
(B). Project acceptance increases value if the observed signal is G and destroys value when it is
B. Watchdogs cannot observe project quality but believe that it is good (bad) with probability π
(1 − π).
B . Payoffs
Insiders’ payoffs depend on their signal regarding project quality, whether the project is ac-
cepted, and whether a penalty, P , is assessed on insiders for a lack of consensus. Let a ∈ {0, 1}
represent the project acceptance decision with a = 1 representing project acceptance (A) and a = 0
indicating rejection (R). Let c ∈ {0, 1} represent a lack of consensus among board members, with
c = 1 indicating consensus and c = 0 indicating a lack of consensus. In the absence of consen-
sus among board members, a penalty may be imposed at random on insiders on the board. Let
z ∈ {0, 1} indicate the imposition of the penalty, where z = 1 indicates that insiders are assessed
a penalty for lack of consensus. Thus, the ex post payoff of an insider, which we represent by UI ,
is as follows:
UI(a, c, s, z) ≡ a x(I, A, s) + (1 − a) x(I, R, s)− P (1 − c) z, (1)
where x is a function mapping agent identity, voting outcome, and signal into payoffs. If the agent
is a watchdog, his payoffs depend only on the insiders’ signal regarding project quality and the
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outcome of the vote. Thus, the ex post payoff of a watchdog, which we represent by UW , is as
follows:
UW (a, s) ≡ a x(W, A, s) + (1− a) x(W, R, s). (2)
Let ρ equal the probability that the penalty indicator z = 1. The rankings of the payoffs, x, given
in the above equations, are as follows:
x(I, A, G) > x(I, R, G), x(I, A, B) > x(I, R, B);
x(W, A, G) > x(W, R, G), x(W, A, B) < x(W, R, B).
(3)
π x(W, R, G) + (1− π) x(W, R, B) > π x(W, A, G) + (1 − π) x(W, A, B). (4)
ρ x(I, A, s)− ρ P > x(I, R, s), s = G or B. (5)
Assumption 3 ensures that project acceptance is preferable to insiders regardless of project
quality and that watchdogs prefer to accept the project only when it is good. Assumption 4 implies
that, if watchdogs have to make their accept/reject decision based on their prior information, they
prefer to reject the project. Assumption 5 implies that insiders are willing to pay the price for lack
of consensus if, by paying this price, they will ensure acceptance of the project.
C. Actions and Strategies
The board members play a game consisting of two stages: (1) a communication stage and
(2) a decision stage. Communication occurs after insiders receive their information signal. It is
“cheap” and has no direct effect on agent welfare. Let the jth watchdog’s communication strategy
be represented by the message mWj ∈ MW , where MW is a message space. Similarly, let insider
j’s communication strategy be given by the message mIj ∈ M I .
After board members exchange messages, they vote on the project. Insiders can either vote
to accept the project, Y , or to reject it, N . Watchdogs can either vote to reject, N , or abstain
from voting, A. Let v = (v1, . . .vN ) represent the vector of board votes, V represent the set of
all possible vote vectors, vW represent the subvector of watchdog votes, and let vI represent the
subvector of insider votes. For any vector (or subvector of) v, let #Y(v) represent the number of
yes votes, #A(v) represent the number of abstentions, and let #N (v) represent the number of no
votes.
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The board structure determines the rules for project acceptance and the definition of consen-
sus. In single-tiered boards, all board members cast their votes simultaneously. The project is
accepted if strictly more votes are cast for the project than against the project. Let aO indicate
project acceptance for a single- (or one-) tiered board. It follows that aO(v) = 1 if and only if
#Y(v) > #N (v). Let cO be the indicator function for consensus on a single-tiered board. That is,
cO(v) = 1, if and only if #Y(v) > #N (v) ⇒ #N (vI) = 0 and #Y(v) ≤ #N (v) ⇒ #Y(vI) = 0.
A two-tiered board consists of one board that only includes insiders and another that only
includes watchdogs. Each of the two boards meets separately following the revelation of the project
signal to the insiders. The insider board casts the initial vote. If a majority of insiders vote to
reject the project, the project is not undertaken and no vote is required of the second or watchdog
board. Otherwise, the project’s fate is decided by a majority vote by the watchdog board. The
project is accepted unless a majority of the watchdog board vote to reject. Let aT indicate project
acceptance for a two-tiered board. It follows that aT (v) = 1 if and only if #Y(vI) > #N (vI) and
#A(vW ) ≥ #N (vW ). Insiders face a penalty for lack of concensus if either there is a split vote on
the insider board or if unanimous acceptance by the insider board is followed by rejection by the
watchdog board. Thus, cT , the indicator function for consensus on a two-tiered board, equals 0 if
and only if 0 < #Y(vI) < i, or #Y(vI) = i and #N (vW ) > #A(vW ).
D. Results
In this section we develop the hypotheses that are tested using our experimental data. We
examine voting patterns of boards and the investment policies adopted by them. In our context,
board effectiveness is captured by the nature of the investment policy adopted by the board. The
first-best policy, which we term the institutionally preferred policy, calls for project acceptance if
and only if project quality is good, that is, when insiders observe signal G. First, we examine voting
by single-tier boards. We examine three types of single-tier boards—(i) a board with an insider
majority, as is the case with most boards in countries such as the U.K. and France; (ii) a board with
a single insider and watchdog majority as has been advocated by a number of commentators; (iii)
finally, we examine voting when watchdogs command a majority on the board and the board has
multiple insiders as is the case with most U.S. boards. The section concludes with an examination
of two-tiered boards that are common in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands.
11
E. Single-tiered Boards
Consider a board with a majority of insiders. Every insider prefers undertaking the project
to rejecting it regardless of her information signal. Because insiders command a majority on
the board, watchdogs are powerless to overturn any insider consensus. Thus, insiders can force
acceptance of the project if they act in concert. Further, a defection by any group of insiders
that can result in project rejection is not sustainable, as a subgroup of the defectors will always
be able to increase their payoffs by defecting back to voting for project acceptance regardless of
its quality. It follows that effective coordination between insiders can lead to overinvestment by
insider-dominated boards.
Theorem 1. In all coalition-proof equilibria, when i > w, all insiders vote to accept the project
under both information signals, watchdog votes are unrestricted, and the project is accepted re-
gardless of the information signal. Moreover, coalition-proof equilibria exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
Insider dominated boards can also implement the institutionally preferred policy. This is likely
to occur when coordination between insiders is not possible or breaks down. With multiple insid-
ers on the board, insiders know that if other insiders are providing “honest” recommendations by
conditioning their messages on the information signal and voting in accordance with their recom-
mendation, unilateral efforts of a single insider to ensure project acceptance under both signals is
futile and will simply call down the penalty for consensus failure. Because the implementation of
the institutionally preferred investment policy produces the highest possible payoff to watchdogs,
they will vote in a manner that will not counter the insider votes. Thus, an equilibrium in which
all insiders truthfully report their signals is sustainable and results in implementation of the insti-
tutionally preferred policy. We call this outcome, consensus among insiders and truthful revelation
of their information resulting in the implementation of the institutionally preferred policy, the
efficient outcome.
Theorem 2. (i) When i > w, there exists a Nash equilibrium implementing the efficient outcome.
In all Nash equilibria that implement the efficient outcome all insiders vote Y if they observe the
signal G and vote N if they observe the signal B.
Proof. See Appendix.
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A switch to a watchdog majority board tilts the balance of voting power away from insiders.
This can render insider coordination futile. If the shift in voting power is accompanied by reducing
insider representation to one, the tilt toward watchdogs also results in a dramatic change in board
effectiveness. Because there is but a single insider on the board, insider coordination is perfect.
This eliminates the possibility of efficient equilibria that result in the institutionally preferred
policy. To see this, note that for the institutionally preferred policy to be implemented it would
have to be the case that the insider sends messages that accurately reveal his signal regarding
project quality. If watchdogs vote in accordance with the insider’s messages, he can always achieve
his most preferred outcome, project acceptance regardless of the information signal, by switching
the message he issues following the receipt of the signal B to the message he transmits following
the receipt of G.
Theorem 3. (i) When w > i = 1, there does not exist any Nash equilibrium implementing the
efficient outcome.
In addition to eliminating efficient equilibria, a switch to a watchdog majority with only one
insider also changes the nature of the coalition-proof equilibria. Because the watchdogs cannot rely
on the solitary insider to accurately reveal his information signal, they are left with the choice of
either always voting to reject the project or always voting to accept. Because they prefer rejecting
to accepting based on their prior beliefs, watchdogs will choose the latter course of action. Because
there is but one insider on the board, only one watchdog need always cast a reject vote while the
rest abstain. Faced with watchdog rejection of the project, to avoid incurring the penalty for board
dissent, the insider will also always vote to reject regardless of his signal.
Theorem 4. In all coalition-proof equilibria, when w > i = 1, the insider votes to reject the
project under both information signals, at least one watchdog also votes to reject, and the project
is rejected regardless of the information signal. Moreover, coalition-proof equilibria exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the watchdog majority is maintained and multiplicity of insiders is restored, we arrive at the
situation examined in Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003). As they demonstrate, coordination among
the watchdog majority eliminates the possibility of overinvestment resulting from coordination
among insiders. Thus, all coalition-proof equilibria result in underinvestment. However, for the
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reasons described earlier, the multiplicity of insiders ensures that, when they do not coordinate
their actions, Nash equilibria exist that implement the institutionally preferred investment policy.
Theorem 5. When w > i > 1, (i) In all coalition-proof equilibria, (a) all insiders vote to
reject the project under both information signals and (b) under both information signals, enough
watchdogs vote against the project to ensure that, even if all insiders were to switch their votes
to acceptance, the project would still be rejected. Moreover, coalition-proof equilibria exist. (ii) A
Nash equilibrium implementing the efficient outcome exists. In all Nash equilibria that implement
the efficient outcome all insiders vote Y if they observe the signal G and vote N if they observe
the signal B.
Proof. See Appendix.
Together, these results indicate that the composition of a single-tiered board can have a marked
impact on the nature of decisions made by the board. A multiplicity of insiders is essential for
the implementation of the institutionally preferred policy. Further, the direction of any distortion
from the institutionally preferred policy is crucially dependent on the identity of the group com-
manding the majority of votes on the board—a watchdog majority biases investment policy toward
underinvestment while an insider majority biases it toward overinvestment.
F . Two-tiered Boards
Now consider a two-tiered board. With a two-tiered board, watchdogs control one board
tier and can block insider proposals even if they are outnumbered by insiders overall. Because
watchdogs have effective blocking power in two-tiered boards, even when they are outnumbered by
insiders, they have the ability to force outcomes that are consistent with the presence of a watchdog
majority on a single-tier board. Further, because there are many insiders, just as in the case of
a single-tiered board with multiple insiders, no one insider can change the outcome of the vote
when other insiders are voting together. As explained earlier, this permits Nash equilibria that
implement the institutionally preferred policy. In summary, when there is more than one insider
on the board, the theoretically predicted outcomes for two-tiered boards and single-tiered boards
with watchdog majorities are identical.
Theorem 6. On a two-tiered board, when i > 1, (i) In all coalition-proof equilibria, all insiders
vote to reject the project under both information signals. (ii) A Nash equilibrium implementing
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the efficient outcome exists. In all Nash equilibria that implement the efficient outcome all insiders
vote Y if they observe the signal G and vote N if they observe the signal B.
Proof. See Appendix.
In summary, when insiders control the board, it is in their collective interest to form coalitions
that produce overinvestment. Once insiders lose control, either through becoming a minority on
a single-tiered board or having their vote subjected to a veto by a second board tier consisting
of watchdogs, the formation of insider coalitions is counterproductive for insiders themselves. In
this case, the coordination problem produced by including many insiders on the board supports
equilibria which are preferred by both insiders and watchdogs.
III. Experimental Design
We ran an experiment to examine the performance of each of the board types examined above.
The experimental subjects were undergraduate and graduate students. They were told they would
have an opportunity to earn money in a research experiment involving group decision making.
Every subject participated in only one experimental session.
A. The Basic Design
In the following section we describe the experimental procedures for all treatments. All the
single-tiered board treatments employed identical procedures.6 The two-tiered board treatments
employed similar procedures with the necessary modifications made to accommodate the additional
tier of the board. We first describe the procedures for the single-tiered board. We then outline the
differences in the instructions and procedures for the two-tiered board.
Once subjects were assembled at the venue for an experiment, they were read a set of in-
structions (see Appendix B); they completed assigned worksheets, and were given the opportunity
to ask questions. The language used throughout the experiment was neutral with respect to the
framing of the problem. At the end of the instructional period, the monitors randomly assigned
subjects their agent type—insider or watchdog, and then assigned them to groups of seven.
6 The experimental procedures for the single-tiered board treatments are similar to those em-
ployed by Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003) except that we provide subjects with higher payoffs.
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Groups dispersed to different ends of a large classroom to commence the session. Each round
began with a period of communication between group members. Communication followed the
group-subgroup sequence: Communication was permitted first among all members of a group,
and then within subgroups based on agent type. The following restrictions applied: No physical
threats, no side payments, no communication among groups, and a maximum of four minutes for
each discussion period. Subjects never appeared to find this time limit to be binding. Next, the
insiders from each group watched as one of them was randomly chosen to draw the project type
from a bucket. To ensure that good and bad draws had equal probabilities, the bucket contained
50 white chips (good outcome) and 50 red chips (bad outcome) and chips were replaced after each
draw. Following a draw, the insiders returned to their groups and a discussion among all members
of each group commenced. The discussions seldom approached the two minute time limit. Private
ballots were cast following this discussion. A monitor then counted the votes. The project was
undertaken if the yes votes outnumbered the no votes. When the yes votes equaled or were fewer
than the no votes, the project was rejected. The monitor privately informed each group of the
outcome and distribution of votes by agent types.
All single-tiered board treatments incorporated the following penalty feature for split votes:
If at least one insider’s vote did not conform with the majority vote for the group, a monitor drew
a chip from a bucket of poker chips that contained 20 blue chips and 80 white ones. Chips were
replaced after each draw. All insiders in the group were assessed a penalty if a blue chip was drawn.
The outcome, together with the project type and the occurrence of a split vote, determined payoffs
for the round.
In accordance with Assumption 3, payoffs were designed to ensure that insiders preferred
to accept the project regardless of the outcome. Absent the penalty for lack of consensus, they
received at least $2.70 following project acceptance, compared with a maximum $1.80 following its
rejection. When a penalty was imposed, insider payoffs fell by $0.75. Thus, insiders earned at least
$1.95 if the project was undertaken even if a penalty was imposed. Because this was higher than
their expected $1.80 payoff if the project was rejected and no penalty was imposed, in accordance
with Assumption 5, the penalty for lack of consensus was not sufficient to reverse their preferences
between investing in the project and rejecting it. Watchdogs’ payoffs were designed to ensure that
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they preferred taking on the project only if it was good. They could expect to earn $2.10 from
project acceptance conditional on a good draw and $0.30 from acceptance conditional on a bad
draw. Consistent with Assumption 4, their expected payoff of $1.20 from acceptance was less than
their expected payoff of $1.50 from rejection. All payoffs were common knowledge.
A round ended after subjects learned about the outcome, participated in the penalty draw if
applicable, and calculated their earnings. Each experimental session consisted of 10 rounds, but
subjects essentially played a game with an indefinite endpoint since they were not told how many
rounds they would play.
The two-tiered board treatments differed in terms of the communication and voting procedures
as well as the rules for determining the outcome of the vote and the imposition of a penalty draw.
In the two-tiered treatments, subjects were assigned to one of two boards—the managerial board
consisting of four members and the supervisory board consisting of three members.7 All insiders
were assigned to the managerial board and all watchdogs were assigned to the supervisory board.
First, as in the case of the single-tiered board, insiders on the managerial board met as a subgroup
and then observed the outcome of the project quality draw. Each insider then voted to either accept
or reject the project. If the majority of the managerial board voted to reject the project, the round
ended. Otherwise, a representative of the managerial board conveyed the voting distribution to
the supervisory board. After receiving this information and having an opportunity to question the
representative of the managerial board, members of the supervisory board privately voted to either
reject the project or abstain. A project recommended by the managerial board was considered to
be accepted so long as no more than one member of the three-person supervisory board voted to
reject. A penalty draw was imposed on the insiders under two conditions–(i) a split vote by the
7 Care was taken to ensure that the language employed in the experiments was not suggestive.
We chose to use this board composition rather than one in which the managerial board had three
members and the supervisory board four members. Our choice was made to highlight the fact,
explained in the previous section, that watchdogs do not need to outnumber insiders to gain voting
control of a two-tiered board. Further, all two-tiered boards with multiple insiders are theoretically
equivalent in that they support the same equilibrium outcomes.
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managerial board or (ii) unanimous approval by the managerial board followed by rejection by the
supervisory board. The payoff structure for subjects was identical to the structure used in the
single-tiered board treatments; that is, subject payoffs contingent on the project quality draw, the
board decision, and the penalty draw were identical across the single-tiered and two-tiered board
treatments.
For each type of board we employed two treatments—a random mixing protocol (RAN)
whereby, after each round, subjects were randomly assigned to new groups, and for robustness
a repeated mixing protocol (RE) where subjects stayed in the same groups for the entire experi-
mental session. In all treatments, subjects maintained their agent type for the entire session. This
variation in mixing protocols was motivated by extant research, which demonstrates that mixing
protocols can influence experimental outcomes (see, e.g., Eckel and Holt (1989)). The random
mixing protocol is designed to implement the single-shot games modeled in the previous section.
Thus, we would expect stronger correspondence between the results in random mixing treatments
and our theoretical predictions. The repeated mixing protocol allows us to examine the robustness
of our results to repeated interactions between board members, which is common in actual boards.
Table I describes the salient features of the treatments including the number of groups em-
ploying each treatment. The first four columns describe the random mixing treatments. The last
four columns describe the repeated treatments. The treatment WMAJRAN modeled single-tiered,
watchdog-controlled boards and used four watchdogs and three insiders. The treatment labeled
IMAJRAN was designed to examine single-tiered insider-controlled boards and employed four in-
siders and three watchdogs, while in the treatment labeled SIRAN only one subject was assigned
the role of the insider and the other six subjects were assigned to be watchdogs on a single-tiered
board. The two-tiered random mixing treatment is labeled TTRAN. A separate treatment employ-
ing the repeated groups protocol was employed for each of these board structures. The single-tiered
majority watchdog treatment with repeated groups is labeled WMAJRE, its insider majority coun-
terpart is labeled IMAJRE, and the single-tiered single-insider treatment with repeated groups is
labeled SIRE. The two-tiered repeated mixing treatment is labeled TTRE.
IV. Results
We now examine results from the random mixing treatments that most closely fit our the-
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oretical analysis along four dimensions:(1) the incidence of the institutionally preferred outcome,
(2) insider voting patterns, (3) watchdog voting patterns, and (4) the predictive success of the two
competing equilibria. The results indicate that single-tiered watchdog majority boards are most
efficient in implementing the institutionally preferred policy. Two-tiered boards are more efficient
than single-tiered boards with insider majorities. However, they display a conservative bias and
are more likely than single-tiered boards to reject good projects. The results also indicate that the
efficient equilibria have greater predictive power for single-tiered boards with watchdog majorities
and for two-tiered boards. In contrast, the coalition-proof equilibria supporting overinvestment
perform better when single-tiered boards have insider majorities.
A. Incidence of the Institutionally Preferred Outcome
Table II presents the frequency with which the institutionally preferred outcome occurred.
From the table it is apparent that single-tiered boards with watchdog majorities are the most
successful in implementing the institutionally preferred outcome. The institutionally preferred
outcome was implemented at least 93.3 percent of the time in these treatments. Single-tiered
treatments employing multiple insiders (WMAJRAN) generated results very similar to those from
treatments employing only a single insider (SIRAN). Two-tiered boards were less effective in imple-
menting the institutionally preferred policy. It was implemented 80 percent of the time (TTRAN).
Single-tiered boards with an insider majority resulted in the lowest incidence of the institutionally
preferred outcome. It occurred 61.7 percent of the time (IMAJRAN). A noteworthy difference
between the performance of the two-tiered boards and the single-tiered boards is that two-tiered
boards resulted in a higher incidence of rejection of good projects. The relative efficiency of the
two-tiered boards in comparison to the single-tiered board with an insider majority arises from the
higher rejection rate for bad projects. These two results suggest that two-tiered boards are more
conservative than single-tiered boards.
Chi-square tests reported in Table III confirm that the incidence of the institutionally preferred
outcome is significantly lower when there is a majority of insiders on the board relative to when
there is a majority of watchdogs on the board. This difference is more pronounced following bad
draws. Table III also confirms our interpretation of the differences between two-tiered boards and
single-tiered boards. The tests suggest that, for good projects, the likelihood of the implementation
19
of the institutionally preferred policy by a two-tiered board will be significantly different from the
likelihood of implementation by any of the three forms of single-tiered boards examined. For bad
projects, the difference in the likelihood of implementation of the institutionally preferred policy is
only significant for two-tiered boards versus single-tiered boards with insider majorities. In order to
control for unobserved heterogeneity caused by differences in the characteristics of the participants
in the different sessions, we also tested for differences in aggregate outcomes using a random
effects probit model. These results are reported in Table IV. Except in cases such as the single
insider treatment (SIRAN) where all rounds and all sessions produced the same outcome (making
it impossible to distinguish between session and treatment effects) these results are consistent with
those of the simple Chi-square tests reported in Table III.
These experimental results contrast in a number of dimensions with our theoretical predictions.
First, insider majority boards do implement the institutionally preferred outcome most of the time.
In fact, even after a bad draw, when insider interests are opposed to institutional interest, they
implement the institutionally preferred outcome in excess of 15 percent of the time. This result
contrasts strongly with our theoretical results which show that insiders obtain a uniformly higher
payoff in the coalition-proof equilibria in which the project is always accepted. Another interesting
contrast between theory and the experimental outcomes is the efficiency advantage of single-tiered
watchdog majority boards over two-tiered boards. Both board designs support identical coalition-
proof outcomes as well as identical efficient outcomes. Finally, in strong contrast to the predictions
of even the Nash equilibrium concept is the efficiency of the single-insider single-tiered board. Under
this design, the efficient outcome can never be produced by a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless,
this design had nearly equivalent efficiency with the most efficient board structure design in the
experiments—the single-tiered watchdog majority. At the same time, we obtain many results
that are consistent with theory. Notably, passing from a single-tiered insider majority board to a
two-tiered board increases efficiency. Also, although the efficiency of the insider majority board
is higher than expected given theory, consistent with theory, it is less efficient than single-tiered
watchdog majority and two-tiered designs.
B . Insider Voting Patterns
Table V presents the distribution of insider votes across the four treatments. Insiders tended
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to vote as a group. The only exceptions were one round of treatment WMAJRAN, two rounds
of treatment IMAJRAN, and four rounds of TTRAN. In the single-tiered board treatments all
instances of split insider votes followed bad draws for project quality. Following a good draw all
insiders in all groups across all treatments voted to accept the project except in two rounds of
TTRAN. Following bad draws, there is evidence that some insiders voted to accept in every board
design with the exception of the single insider board. For example, all insiders voted to accept
4 of 33 times in treatment WMAJRAN. However, this voting pattern was common only in the
single-tiered insider majority treatments and two-tiered treatments.
Overall, insider voting patterns varied across treatments as one would expect given the vari-
ation in the implementation of the institutionally preferred outcome. Single-tiered boards with
insider majorities generated the highest frequency of yes votes by insiders following bad draws.
While such votes were frequently observed in the two-tiered board treatments, their incidence was
less frequent. The lowest frequency of yes votes by insiders following bad draws was observed in
the single-tiered board treatments with watchdog majorities. The frequency of unanimous no votes
by insiders following bad draws tells a similar story regarding opportunistic behavior of insiders.
In the IMAJRAN sessions, only in 3 of 28 rounds of bad draws did all of the insiders in a group
vote against the project. In comparison, the number of unanimous no votes by insiders climbed
to 19 out of 34 in treatment TTRAN, 28 out of 33 for treatment WMAJRAN, and 20 out of 20 in
treatment SIRAN.
C. Watchdog Voting Patterns
Watchdog voting patterns are presented in Table VI. With the exception of the single-tiered
insider majority treatment, watchdog votes appear correlated with the outcome of the project
quality draw—watchdogs tended to abstain following good draws and vote to reject following bad
draws. This suggests that insiders were accurately transmitting the outcome of the project quality
draw. However, there are many deviations from this overall voting pattern across all treatments.
Further, there are also a number of instances in which watchdog votes were split. Split votes were
cast 37 of 60 times, the highest frequency of such votes in treatment IMAJRAN, the board design
that provides the insiders with the greatest opportunity to induce the acceptance of bad projects
because of their dominance on the board. The lowest frequency of split votes occurred in the
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single-tiered board treatments that included a majority of watchdogs. These results, together with
the earlier evidence on insider voting patterns, suggest that the increased incidence of opportunistic
behavior by insiders is associated with lower consensus among watchdogs.
D. Subject Votes and Equilibrium Vote Vectors
In this section we examine the predictive power of the equilibria described earlier. To help
assess the results of the experiments, we first describe the predictions of our model for parameter
values that are equal to those employed in our experiments.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that coalition-proof equilibria result in overinvestment when boards
have a majority of insiders. For boards with four insiders and three watchdogs, Theorem 1 sug-
gests that, in all coalition-proof equilibria, all four insiders vote to accept the project under both
information signals, while Theorem 2 indicates that, in all efficient equilibria, all four insiders vote
for the project under information signal G and against the project under information signal B.
In neither case do the equilibrium requirements restrict watchdog votes. A switch to a majority
watchdog board changes both the outcome of coalition-proof equilibria and equilibrium voting
patterns. When the board includes only one insider, Theorem 3 predicts that the sole insider will
vote against the project regardless of the information signal, as will at least one watchdog. If there
are three insiders and four watchdogs on the board, Theorem 5 suggests that, in all coalition-proof
equilibria, all three insiders and at least three watchdogs vote to reject the project under both
information signals, while all three insiders vote for the project under information signal G and
against the project under information signal B; and at least two watchdogs abstain when the in-
formation signal is G in all efficient equilibria. Theorem 6 predicts that, in all efficient equilibria
supported by a two-tiered board, all members of the insider board vote to reject the project when
the information signal is B and accept the project when the information signal is G. At least two
members of the supervisory board will abstain when the signal is G. Further, in all coalition-proof
equilibria, all insiders on the managerial board always vote to reject the project regardless of their
information signal.
To examine the predictive power of the competing equilibria, we computed Selten’s (1991)
measure of predictive success for each equilibrium for each treatment. This measure of predictive
success is computed as ρ − α, where ρ is the relative frequency with which outcomes conform
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with the given equilibrium and measures the accuracy of the theory. The second term, α, is the
probability that outcomes consistent with the equilibrium occur by random chance and captures
the precision of the theory’s predictions. The results are reported in Table VII.
In line with our discussion of the observed frequency of outcomes consistent with the competing
equilibria, we find that the efficient equilibria enjoy greater predictive success than coalition-proof
equilibria for two-tiered boards and single-tiered watchdog majority boards. The difference is
primarily attributable to the poor performance of the coalition-proof equilibria following good
draws. Coalition-proof equilibria also perform poorly following good draws with single-tiered single
insider boards but enjoy much greater predictive success in the treatments with single-tiered insider
majority boards, where the overall success rate for coalition-proof equilibria is 0.85 compared with
0.52 for efficient equilibria. The high observed success rate following bad draws, predicted by
coalition-proof equilibria, is primarily responsible for the high predictive success of these equilibria.
Given that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome for single-tiered boards with a single insider
call for no cooperation or information sharing between insiders and watchdogs, this high level of
efficiency is surprising. However, this result is not surprising from the perspective of experimen-
tal research. In our experiments, revalation of the insiders’ information always leads to efficient
outcomes whenever watchdogs command a majority. Such information sharing between subjects,
even when information sharing is not in the subjects’ self-interest is pervasive in experiments.
(see, e.g., Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, and Bazerman (2002)). Even in contexts where efficient
outcomes cannot be achieved by simple information sharing, agents frequently coordinate to effi-
cient non-Nash outcomes (see, e.g., Ledyard (1995), Camerer (2003, and Fehr, Kircksteiger, and
Reidl (1993)). For example, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) document that 30 out of 32 sub-
jects display non-Nash behavior in a game of perfect information where such non-Nash behavior
has the potential to increase payoffs to all players. Moreover, in their experiments, this sort of
“trust” behavior was less prevalent when agents were in a “stronger” position. Likewise, in our
experiments, we find trust behavior and we find that the prevalence of trust behavior depends
on the strength of the trustee’s position. For example, when insiders command a majority on a
single-tiered board and thus are in a strong position, they sometimes are trustworthy, that is, they
sometimes undertake actions that generate that the group-maximizing payoff. Further, when the
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insiders’ position is at its weakest, as is the case in a single-tiered board with a single insider,
(where all equilibria produce the minimal insider payoff) insiders are always trustworthy in that
they cooperate in attaining the group-maximizing payoff.
V. Results from Repeated Mixing Treatments
We now present results from the four treatments employing the repeated groups protocol. We
focus on (1) the incidence of the institutionally preferred outcome and (2) the predictive success of
the two competing equilibria, with a view to identifying the impact of the switch from the random
mixing protocol.
Table VIII contains information on the incidence of the institutionally preferred outcome.
The table also contains Chi-square statistics comparing the results from each treatment with its
random mixing counterpart. The only notable difference in the adoption of the institutionally
preferred outcome is in the case of the single-tiered board with an insider majority. The stability
of the group appears to greatly increase the frequency with which the board implements the
institutionally preferred policy. The difference is significant following bad draws and appears to
be caused by statistically significantly different voting behavior by both insiders and watchdogs
following bad draws.
Some Chi-square tests we conducted to examine differences in the implementation of the
institutionally preferred policy across board types employing the repeated groups protocol are
not reported in the tables. These tests indicate that the two single-tiered watchdog majority
treatments differed significantly from the single-tiered insider majority treatment. In both cases
the difference appears to be attributable to board votes following bad draws, suggesting that the
stability of board composition does not make up for a lack of a watchdog majority. The Chi-square
tests also confirm our earlier result with random groups that single-tiered groups with watchdog
majorities adopt the institutionally preferred policy more frequently than two-tiered boards, with
the difference in performance attributable to board votes following good draws.
An examination of the distribution of insider and watchdog votes reveals greater consensus
among both insider and watchdog votes in the repeated treatments compared with their random
grouping counterparts in which there was more evidence of insider opportunism. This finding
appears to bolster our conjecture that watchdog concensus is more likely when insiders do not
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behave opportunistically.
Table IX presents evidence on the predictive success of the treatments using repeated groups.
With one exception the predictive success of the competing equilibria across board types appears
similar to that for the random mixing treatments. Once again the coalition-proof equilibria enjoyed
limited success in the single-tiered treatments with watchdog majorities and in the two-tiered
treatments. Further, efficient equilibria enjoyed the greatest success for single-tiered boards with
watchdog majorities and multiple insiders. The one change from the results of the random mixing
protocol treatments can be explained by the lower incidence of insider opportunism in the single-
tiered board treatments with insider majorities. This lower propensity for opportunistic behavior
pushed the predictive success of the efficient equilibria above that of the coalition-proof equilibria
for this treatment. Because the change in mixing protocols did not change in the predictive
success of either set of equilibria following good draws, the improved predictive success of the
efficient equilibria and the decline in the predictive success of the coalition-proof equilibria when
group composition remained stable for single-tiered insider majority boards is attributable solely
to changes in their performance following bad draws.
By restricting group size to seven and running the both repeated and random protocol treat-
ments for single-tiered watchdog majority boards with multiple insiders, we are able to benchmark
our results to Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003). We employed a Chi-square test to check for pos-
sible differences between their results and ours. The Chi-square statistic between the WMAJRAN
and its counterpart in their study is 1.40 for good draws and 0.76 for bad draws. Thus, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that incidence of the institutionally preferred outcomes across the differ-
ent studies’ random mixing protocols are the same. The Chi-square statistic to check for differences
between WMAJRE and GNR’s equivalent REP treatment for good draws is 7.98, and 0.67 for bad
draws. Thus, for good draws at the 0.01 significance level, we can reject that the incidences of the
institutionally preferred outcomes in the repeated group treatments are the same. Looking deeper
we find that the three groups in the WMAJRE treatment of this study were always truthful and
appear to have been trusted by the watchdogs in their respective groups. In Gillette, Noe, and
Rebello’s REP treatment just one of the three groups accounts for most of the non-institutionally
preferred outcomes under the good draws. The instability of the repeated group treatment results
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we observe when comparing our sessions to Gillette, Noe, and Rebello can also be observed between
our own sessions. A possible explanation for this instability for repeated group treatments is that
small variations in initial interactions in the sessions have persistent effects throughout the session,
leading to wide variation in outcomes across sessions.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we modeled and experimentally tested the performance of a variety of corporate
board designs. We showed that all coalition-proof equilibria feature inefficient board decisions,
biased either toward or against insider-preferred policies. However, when the board includes more
than one insider, Nash equilibria exist that implement the efficient policies. When outsiders have
complete control of one of the tiers on a two-tiered board or if they have majority control of a
single-tiered board, these equilibria are preferred by all parties to the coalition-proof equilibria. Our
experimental results showed that, despite their lack of coalition-proofness, institutionally preferred
policies are adopted with considerable frequency as long as outsiders are included on the board,
even when they are a minority. At the same time, increasing outsider representation to give them
a majority on the board greatly increases the likelihood of the efficient outcome. Adding another
tier to the board, one controlled by outsiders, was almost equally efficient in blocking the adoption
of bad projects but was less successful in ensuring the implementation of good projects. When all
but one insider are eliminated from a single-tiered board, efficiency is maintained despite the fact
that efficient outcomes are no longer consistent with the Nash behavior.
These results have a number of implications, both practical and theoretical. First, because our
results show that truly independent outside directors can act as watchdogs even if they do not have
private information regarding the firm’s operations, our results support the call for including more
outside directors on corporate boards. Even minority outsider participation is somewhat effective
in controlling managerial opportunism, especially if the outsider minority controls one tier of a
two-tiered board. However, we find that outsider majority boards are most effective. This result
supports the call for majority outsider representation on boards. Of course directors have roles
other than being watchdogs. As Fama and Jensen (1983) point out, outside directors also provide
information complementary to insider managers’ firm-specific information. Thus, in practical board
design, this informational role, in addition to the watchdog role, will have to be considered in
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determining board composition. The second practical implication of our results is that two-tiered
boards appear to have a conservative bias and thus may engender overly conservative investment
policies and excessive hurdle rates for project adoption. This conservative bias suggests that two-
tiered boards are least suited for high growth firms with rich investment opportunity sets. A third
practical implication of this work is that stable board composition is crucial for implementation of
institutionally preferred policies only when insiders dominate the board. Thus, because there is no
pressing need to guarantee board stability on boards where insiders lack control, firms may vary
board composition as needed based on their changing needs for information that complements that
of their managers’.
As well as providing specific practical insights, our results have some implications for mecha-
nism design and implementation in general. First, they show that when the efficiency refinement
collides with the coalition-proof refinement, efficiency seems to win out. Thus, mechanisms like
ours (and the mechanisms suggested by Palfrey and Srivastava, 1993) that rely on coordination
problems between agents to implement principal-preferred outcomes can work in cases where all
the agents prefer the outcomes of the efficient non-coalition-proof implementing equilibria. Second,
as has been documented in the experimental literature on information sharing, our results indicate
that agents have a tendency to disclose information through cheap talk even when such disclosures
are not in their interest. For example, in the insider majority sessions, insiders could force their
preferred outcome simply by voting as a block and ignoring outsiders. Yet, in the actual play of the
experiment, outsider votes were correlated with the insiders’ private information. Such correlation
is possible only if insiders disclose such information to the minority outsiders. Third, the differ-
ences between our results with two-tiered and single-tiered watchdog majority boards show that
mechanisms with identical efficient and coalition-proof outcomes can produce different behavioral
outcomes because of differences in sequencing and communication protocols.
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Appendix A
A. Single-tiered Board
This appendix provides the formal proofs of Theorems 1 through 6. Before we initiate our
proofs of Theorems 1 through 5, we require some additional notation and definitions. These
definitions and notation are presented below.
An agent’s voting strategy is a map from observed messages into votes. Let MN represent a
vector of messages sent by the agents, vWi a voting strategy for watchdogs, and v
I
i a voting strategy
for insiders. A strategy for an individual agent is thus an ordered pair of communication and voting
strategies. We represent a strategy of watchdog i, by σWi ≡ (mWi , vWi ), and the strategy of insider
i, by σIi ≡ (mIi , vIi ). Finally, let σI represent the vector of insider strategies; let σW represent the
vector of watchdog strategies.
Strategies yield votes via the following functional compositions. The message strategies of the
insiders and watchdogs, and the information signal, s ∈ {G, B}, will produce a pattern of messages.
These messages will, when composed with the voting strategies of the watchdogs, produce the
watchdog vote vector; when composed with insider voting strategies, they produce the insider vote
vector. This process of composition generates a map, from strategies to votes, which we represent
by V(σW , σI(s)). Using the definition of agent utility given in (1) and (2), we see that the utility
of an agent j under strategy vector σ is given by
uj(σ) = E
(
Uj(V(σW , σI), ω)). (A1)
B . Definitions
Definition 1. For agent j, strategy σ′j is a best response to σ
′ ∈ Σ if the following condition
holds for all σ ∈ Σ:
∀k ∈ N − {j}, σk = σ′k ⇒ uj(σ′) ≥ uj(σ). (A2)
Definition 2. A strategy vector σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all j ∈ N , σ∗j is a best response
for j to σ∗.
Definition 3. A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is defined by induction on the size of coalitions
as follows. Let S ⊂ N ,
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(i) Suppose #(S) = 1, then S = {j} for some j ∈ N . In this case, σ is optimal for S = {j} if and
only if σj is a best response to σ for j.
(ii) Assume optimality has been defined for all S such that #(S) ≤ k − 1. Define optimality of
coalitions S of size k as follows:
(a) σ is self-enforcing for S if σ is optimal for T , whenever T is a strict subset of S.
(b) σ is optimal for S if it is self-enforcing for S and there does not exist any strategy vector
σ′ which is also self-enforcing for S such that
∀j ∈ N − S, σ′j = σj , (A3)
∀j ∈ S, uj(σ′) > uj(σ). (A4)
Finally, if σ is optimal for N , we say that σ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4. If σ is a strategy vector and K is a subset of agents containing at least one insider,
then we say that the insiders in K are decisive for σ for signal s if, holding the actions of all other
agents fixed, they can force acceptance of the project. In other words,
#(K ∩ I) + #{j ∈ I − K:Vj(σW , σI(s)) = Y} >
#{j ∈ W :Vj(σW , σI(s)) = N} + #{j ∈ I − K:Vj(σW , σI(s)) = N}. (A5)
Insiders belonging to a subset of agents are decisive for a given information signal if, by
collectively changing their vote to yes when they receive that signal, they can ensure that the project
is accepted. Next note that all insiders have the same payoff function, and that all watchdogs have
the same payoff function. Thus, the strategy vector that maximizes the payoff to a subset of agents
that consists only of insiders or outsiders is well defined. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 5. Let σ be a strategy vector, let K be a nonempty “pure” subset of agents consisting
only of insider types or only of outsider types. Suppose that overall strategy vectors σ′ such that
σ′j = σj , j /∈ K, and σ produces the highest payoff to agents in K, then we say that σ maximizes
payoffs over K.
C. Lemma Used to Establish Theorems 1 and 2
Our most important lemma, Lemma 1, is quite straightforward. It implies that, in coalition-
proof outcomes, pure coalitions consisting of just insiders or just outsiders act as if they are a single
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agent, maximizing their collective payoff over their joint strategy space.
Lemma 1. Let σ be a strategy vector and let K be a nonempty “pure” subset of agents consisting
only of insider types or only of outsider types. The strategy σ is optimal for K if and only if σ
maximizes payoffs over K.
Proof. Our proof is based on induction on the size of the coalition. If the coalition size, which we
represent by k equals one, then the lemma follows from the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
Next, suppose that Lemma 1 holds for a subset of size less than or equal to k. Consider a
pure subset K of size k + 1 and a strategy vector, σ, that maximizes type payoffs over K. All
subsets of a pure subset must be pure. Maximizing a type’s payoff over a subset of K can never
yield a higher payoff than the payoff from maximizing over K. Thus, σ must be self-enforcing for
k + 1. Because σ maximizes over K, no other strategy vector produces a higher payoff. Thus, σ is
optimal for K.
To prove the other leg of the if-and-only-if assertion, suppose that K is a pure coalition of size
k +1 and let σ be a strategy vector that does not maximize type payoffs over K. Then there must
exist a strategy vector, say σ′ 6= σ, such that σ′ equals σ for agents not in K and σ′ maximizes
the payoff over K. (Because there are only a finite number of distinct strategy vectors, existence
of a maximizing vector is guaranteed.) By the results of the previous paragraph, σ′ is optimal,
and thus, a fortiori, self-enforcing for K. This implies that σ cannot be optimal for K. Thus,
maximization of the type payoffs over strategies in K is a necessary condition for optimality as
well.
By Lemma 1, insiders will force project acceptance except when project acceptance is blocked
by sufficient watchdog votes. Because information regarding the information signal is transmitted
only by informed insiders, insiders can always force acceptance under one signal if they can force
acceptance under any signal. This reasoning underlies the next lemma, Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. If σ is any coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, σ, the project is accepted with probability
1 or probability 0.
Proof. Suppose that, under σ, the project is accepted under signal s1 but not under signal s2.
Consider the subset consisting of all insiders. Consider the strategy vector σ′ calling for insiders to
use the message and voting strategy that they use when receiving s1 under σ for both information
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signals. Under σ′ the project is accepted with probability 1. Assumptions (3), (4), and (5) ensure
that this outcome produces a higher insider payoff than strategy σ. Thus, σ cannot maximize the
payoffs over I . Thus, σ is not optimal for I and thus is not coalition-proof.
Because the payoff to watchdogs is always higher if the project is rejected under both signals
than it is if the project is accepted under both signals, the coalition of all watchdogs can always gain
by forcing universal rejection in any candidate equilibrium in which the project is being accepted
with probability 1. Thus, such equilibria are not coalition-proof.
Lemma 3. When w ≥ i, in any coalition-proof equilibrium, insiders are not decisive under either
information signal; that is, under both signals watchdogs cast sufficient votes against the project
to block passage regardless of the votes of the insiders.
Proof. Consider a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium σ. By Lemma 2 we know that if the project
is accepted at all, then the project is accepted with probability 1. Thus, the equilibrium payoff to
watchdogs is π x(W, A, G)+ (1−π) x(W, A, B). Now suppose watchdogs deviate to the strategy of
always voting against the project; that is, consider the strategy vector σ′ defined as follows. For
insiders, play the strategies prescribed by σ; for outsiders, play the message strategies prescribed
by σ but follow the voting strategy of voting against the project regardless of the message sent in
the message phase. Because watchdogs outnumber insiders, the project is rejected with probability
1. Thus, the strategy vector σ′ yields watchdogs a payoff of π x(W, R, G)+ (1− π) x(W, R, B). By
(4), this exceeds the equilibrium payoff under σ. Thus, σ does not maximize watchdog payoffs over
W . By Lemma 1, σ is not optimal for W and thus σ is not coalition-proof.
Because the project is being rejected in all coalition-proof equilibria regardless of how insiders
vote, and because of the penalty imposed on insiders when consensus fails, insiders collectively
have an incentive to vote unanimously against project acceptance when their votes are not decisive.
Thus, coalition-proof outcomes are characterized by unanimous insider rejection.
Lemma 4. When w ≥ i, in any coalition-proof equilibrium, all insiders vote to reject the project.
Proof. To obtain a contradiction, let σ be a coalition-proof equilibrium in which not all insiders vote
to reject the project. From Lemma 3 we know that in any coalition-proof equilibrium the project
is voted down regardless of the insiders’ voting behavior. Consider the subset of agents consisting
of all insiders. If these insiders deviate to a strategy of voting against acceptance regardless of
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the messages sent in the message phase, the deviant strategy, by eliminating the possibility of the
penalty for a lack of consensus, produces a higher payoff than the strategies insiders are playing
under σ. Hence, σ does not maximize payoffs for I . Thus, by Lemma 1, σ is not optimal for I and
hence σ is not coalition-proof.
Lemma 5. When i > w, in any coalition-proof equilibrium, watchdogs are not decisive under
either information signal; that is, under both signals insiders cast sufficient votes in favor of the
project to ensure passage regardless of the votes of the watchdogs.
Proof. Consider a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium σ. By Lemma 2 we know that if the project
is rejected at all, then the project is rejected with probability 1. Thus, the equilibrium payoff to
insiders is π x(I, R, G) + (1 − π) x(I, R, B).
Now suppose insiders deviate to the strategy of always voting for the project; that is, consider
the strategy vector σ′ defined as follows. For watchdogs, play the strategies prescribed by σ;
for insiders, play the message strategies prescribed by σ but follow the voting strategy of voting
for the project regardless of the message sent in the message phase. Because insiders outnumber
watchdogs, the project is accepted with probability 1. Thus, the strategy vector σ′ yields insiders
a payoff of π x(I, A, G) + (1 − π) x(I, A, B). By (4), this exceeds the equilibrium payoff under σ.
Thus, σ does not maximize payoffs for I . By Lemma 1, σ is not optimal for I and thus σ is not
coalition-proof.
Lemma 6. When i > w, in any coalition-proof equilibrium, all insiders vote to reject the project.
Proof. To obtain a contradiction, let σ be a coalition-proof equilibrium in which not all insiders vote
to accept the project. From Lemma 5 we know that in any coalition-proof equilibrium the project
is accepted regardless of the insiders’ voting behavior. Consider the subset of agents consisting
of all insiders. If these insiders deviate to a strategy of voting for acceptance regardless of the
messages sent in the message phase, the deviant strategy, by eliminating the possibility of the
penalty for a lack of consensus, produces a higher payoff than the strategies insiders are playing
under σ. Hence, σ does not maximize payoffs for I . Thus, by Lemma 1, σ is not optimal for I and
hence σ is not coalition-proof.
Lemmas 1 to 6 characterize coalition-proof equilibria. We now turn our attention to proving
that coalition-proof equilibria exist. The existence proof requires us to consider mixed insider–
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watchdog coalitions. Characterizing such coalitions motivates the following definitions.
Definition 6. A coalition of agents, K, is flawed under strategy vector σ, if there exists an
information signal s such that the following conditions hold.
a. The project is rejected under s; that is, for some s,
#Y(V(σW , σI(s))) ≤ #N (V(σW , σI(s))).
b. The coalition K contains at least one insider.
c. The insiders in K are decisive for σ under s.
A flawed coalition contains a subset of insider agents who are decisive for project acceptance
yet fail to ensure that the project is always accepted. In the subsequent analysis we will show that
equilibria in which the set of all agents is flawed are not coalition-proof. Because coalition-proofness
is defined by induction on subset size, we must define flawed coalitions not only for the set of all
agents, but also for all proper subsets of agents. The next lemma shows that, when the strategy
vector is flawed by collective changes in their strategy, a sufficiently large coalition of insiders can
always modify their strategies to ensure project acceptance.
Lemma 7. If J is flawed for σ and if all insiders not in J are sending the same message under
both signals, there exists a strategy vector, σ′, which specifies the same strategies as σ for all
watchdogs and insiders not in J such that the project is accepted with probability 1.
Proof. We construct the strategy vector as follows. Let K = I∪J , for all agents not in K; let σ′ = σ.
Next, determine the signal, say s′, under which insiders are decisive. Each agent in K should (a)
send under both signals the message that, under σ, she sent under s′, and (b) subsequently vote
to accept the project regardless of the pattern of messages received. This strategy will ensure that
the project is accepted under both signals with the unanimous support of insiders in K.
Lemma 8. If J is flawed for σ and if all insiders not in J are sending the same message under
both signals, then σ is not optimal for J .
Proof. By Lemma 6, σ does not maximize the payoff over I ∪ J . Thus, by Lemma 1, σ is not
optimal for J .
Lemma 9. When w ≥ i, there exists a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under which the project
is rejected with probability 1 and all insiders cast votes against project acceptance under both
information signals.
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Proof. Consider the strategy vector σ defined as follows. All agents send the same arbitrary
message, m0, independent of the information signal, that is mWi = m
I
i (s) = m0. All insiders and
watchdogs follow the strategy of voting N regardless of the information signal, that is, vWi (m) = N ,
vIi (m, G) = N , vIi (m, B) = N . To show that this is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, we need
to show that σ is optimal for all subsets of N . To show this we provide a proof by induction on
subset size. First note that when the subsets contain a single element, optimality simply requires
that for all agents j, σj is a best response to σ for j. However, no individual agent can change the
project acceptance decision by unilaterally changing his strategy. Moreover, insiders may call down
a penalty if they deviate from the consensus. Thus, the assertion of optimality holds for all subsets
of size one. Next suppose that, for subsets of size less than or equal to k, optimality holds. Consider
a subset K of size k + 1. Given the induction hypotheses and the definition of coalition-proofness,
optimality requires that there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy for K that yields all
the agents in K a higher payoff. If K consists only of watchdogs, K cannot produce a higher payoff
because, given the uninformative messages of insiders, watchdogs cannot induce a strategy vector
that accepts the project under the good information signal and rejects the project under the bad
signal. Given assumptions (3), (4), and (5), rejecting the project under both signals produces a
higher payoff to watchdogs than accepting the project under both signals. No improving vector of
strategies exists for K, and thus, a fortiori, no self-enforcing vector of strategies exists for K when
K consists of a set of watchdogs. Next note that a coalition of all insiders does not have sufficient
votes to change the outcome. Thus, such a subset cannot increase its welfare by deviating from the
equilibrium. Only a mixed coalition, by implementing a vector of strategies calling for rejection
when the information signal is B and acceptance when the information signal is G, can increase
the payoff to all agents in K. However, by our earlier definition, such a coalition is flawed. Lemma
6 shows that a flawed coalition is not optimal and thus, a fortiori, is not self-enforcing. Thus,
optimality for coalitions of size k +1 has been established, proving the assertion of the theorem by
induction.
Lemma 10. When i > w, there exists a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under which the project
is accepted with probability 1 and all insiders vote for project acceptance under both information
signals.
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Proof. Consider the strategy vector σ defined as follows. All agents send the same arbitrary
message, m0, independent of the information signal, that is, mWi = m
I
i (s) = m0. All insiders follow
the strategy of voting Y regardless of the information signal, that is, vIi (m, G) = N , vIi (m, B) = N .
All watchdogs abstain, that is vWi (m) = A. To show that this is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium,
we need to show that σ is optimal for all subsets of N . To show this we provide a proof by induction
on subset size. First note that when the subsets contain a single element, optimality simply requires
that for all agents j, σj is a best response to σ for j. However, no individual agent can change
the project acceptance decision by unilaterally changing his strategy. Moreover, insiders may call
down a penalty if they deviate from the consensus. Thus, the assertion of optimality holds for
all subsets of size one. Next suppose that, for subsets of size less than or equal to k, optimality
holds. Consider a subset K of size k + 1. Given the induction hypotheses and the definition of
coalition-proofness, optimality requires that there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy
for K that yields all the agents in K a higher payoff. If K consists only of insiders, K cannot
produce a higher payoff because given assumptions (3), (4), and (5), accepting the project under
both signals produces the highest payoff to insiders. Next note that a coalition of all watchdogs
does not have sufficient votes to change the outcome. Thus, such a subset cannot increase its
welfare by deviating from the equilibrium. There also exists no self-enforcing strategy for a mixed
coalition to deviate from the equilibrium as any insiders in the deviating coalition will be strictly
worse off than they are under the equilibrium. Thus, optimality for coalitions of size k + 1 has
been established, proving the assertion of the lemma by induction.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of the part of the first claim that all insiders vote to accept
the project under both information signals, watchdog votes are unrestricted, and the project is
accepted regardless of the information signal, follows directly from Lemmas 5 and 6. The existence
of coalition-proof equilibria follows from Lemma 10.
Proof of Theorem 2. First we prove the claim that in all Nash equilibria that implement the
efficient outcome all insiders vote Y if they observe the signal G and vote N if they observe the
signal B. To see this, note that consensus among insiders is necessary in all Nash equilibria that
implement the efficient outcome. This follows because a lack of unanimity among insiders would
result in the possibility that insiders would bear a penalty.
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Next we show that an equilibrium exists that implements the efficient outcome. The equilib-
rium is given as follows. All agents send the same arbitrary message m0, that is, mWi = m
I
i (s) =
m0. All insiders follow the strategy of voting Y if and only if they receive information signal G;
vIi (m, G) = Y , vIi (m, B) = N . All watchdogs abstain regardless of the messages they observe,
vWi (m) = A. In this candidate equilibrium, the vote of an individual agent cannot change the
project selected. Moreover, for insiders, deviation from the strategy may incur the penalty for lack
of consensus. Thus, unilateral deviations from the candidate information strategy vector cannot
increase the payoff to any of the agents. It follows that the candidate strategy vector is a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that a Nash equilibrium exists that implements the efficient
outcome. Let the strategy vector supporting this equilibrium be σ. Now consider the strategy
vector σ′. Let σ′wj = σ
w
j for all j ∈ W . For the sole insider, let σ′
i
k(B) = σ
′i
k(G) = σ
i
k(G); that
is, under σ′ the insider sends the same message and votes the same way as he would following the
observation of signal G under strategy σ. It follows that the project will be accepted regardless of
the signal. Further, from assumption (3), the insider is strictly better off under σ′. It follows then
that σ could not support a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof of the part of the first claim that the insider votes to reject the
project under both information signals, at least one watchdog votes to reject at all times, and the
project is rejected regardless of the information signal, follows directly from Lemmas 3 and 4. The
existence of coalition-proof equilibria follows from Lemma 9.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof of (i) is identical to that of Theorem 4. The proof of the claim
that the insider votes to reject the project under both information signals, at least one watchdog
votes to reject at all times, and the project is rejected regardless of the information signal, follows
directly from Lemmas 3 and 4. The existence of coalition-proof equilibria follows from Lemma 9.
The proof of (ii) is identical to the proof of Theorem 2. First we prove the claim that, in all
Nash equilibria that implement the efficient outcome, all insiders vote Y if they observe the signal
G and vote N if they observe the signal B. To see this, note that consensus among insiders is
necessary in all Nash equilibria that implement the efficient outcome. This follows because a lack
of unanimity among insiders would result in the possibility that insiders would bear a penalty.
36
Next we show that an equilibrium exists that implements the efficient outcome. The equilib-
rium is given as follows. All agents send the same arbitrary message m0, that is, mWi = m
I
i (s) =
m0. All insiders follow the strategy of voting Y if and only if they receive information signal G;
vIi (m, G) = Y , vIi (m, B) = N . All watchdogs abstain regardless of the messages they observe,
vWi (m) = A. In this candidate equilibrium, the vote of an individual agent cannot change the
project selected. Moreover, for insiders, deviation from the strategy may incur the penalty for lack
of consensus. Thus, unilateral deviations from the candidate information strategy vector cannot
increase the payoff to any of the agents. It follows that the candidate strategy vector is a Nash
equilibrium.
D. Two-tiered Board
Before we initiate our proof of Theorem 6, we require some additional notation and definitions
as the communication and voting sequence for a two-tiered board is different from that of a single-
tiered board. These definitions and notation are presented below.
An agent’s voting strategy is a map from observed messages into votes. Let vWi represent a
vote by watchdog i and vIi a vote for insider i. Given that they communicate with each other and
cast their votes based on messages exchanged among insiders alone, a strategy for an insider is
thus an ordered pair of messages and votes. We represent a strategy for insider i by σIi ≡ (mIi , vIi ).
Finally, let σI represent the vector of insider strategies.
Note that the supervisory board receives a report from a representative of the executive board
following a majority yes vote by the executive board.8 Let this event be represented by σR ∈ ΣR,
where ΣR ≡ {(σI , mR) : Y(vI) > N (vI)} and mR is a function mapping the results of the insider
voting into a report. Given that they vote after insiders vote to accept, watchdog strategies are
conditional on σR.
Given the sequence of voting and communication, we restrict attention to subgame perfect
Nash equilibria and coalition-proof equilibria where coalition formation is subgame perfect, that
8 Given that all insiders are identical and receive the same payoff, it does not matter which
insider presents this report to the supervisory board.
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is, coalitions are formed only among members of the same board tier.
Proof of Theorem 6. Because coalition formation is subgame perfect, coalitions can be formed
only between agents with identical payoffs. Thus, an equilibrium is coalition-proof in this sense if
and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the aggregate payoff of each agent type. Thus,
it is easy to see that no equilibrium exists in which the project is ever accepted. Suppose that
such an equilibrium existed, then there would be a vote and message combination for insiders that
induces project acceptance and thus insiders would have incentive and ability to always send this
message and vote vector. It follows that the project would always be accepted. However, if the
project were always accepted, watchdogs would maximize their aggregate payoff by rejecting the
project.
The proof of (ii) is identical to the proof of Theorem 2. First we prove the claim that, in all
Nash equilibria that implement the efficient outcome, all insiders vote Y if they observe the signal
G and vote N if they observe the signal B. To see this, note that consensus among insiders is
necessary in all Nash equilibria that implement the efficient outcome. This follows because a lack
of unanimity among insiders would result in the possibility that insiders would bear a penalty.
Next we show that an equilibrium exists that implements the efficient outcome. The equilib-
rium is given as follows. All agents send an arbitrary message at each stage of the game (including
the report to the supervisory board). All insiders follow the strategy of voting Y if and only if
they receive information signal G; vIi (m, G) = Y , vIi (m, B) = N . All watchdogs abstain regardless
of the messages and report they observe vWi (m) = A. In this candidate equilibrium, the vote
of an individual agent cannot change the project selected. Moreover, for insiders, deviation from
the strategy may incur the penalty for lack of consensus. Thus, unilateral deviations from the
candidate information strategy vector cannot increase the payoff to any of the agents. It follows
that the candidate strategy vector is a Nash equilibrium.
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